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Abstract 
In The Gay Science (1882), Nietzsche heralded the problem of nihilism with his famous 
declaration “God is dead,” which signalled the collapse of a transcendent basis for the 
underpinning morality of European civilization.  He associated this collapse with the rise of the 
natural sciences whose methods and pervasive outlook he was concerned would progressively 
shape “an essentially mechanistic [and hence meaningless] world.”  The Russian novelist 
Turgenev had also associated a scientific outlook with nihilism through the scientism of Yevgeny 
Bazarov, a character in Fathers and Sons.  A century or so later, can we correlate relevant 
scientific results and the nihilistic consequences that worried these and other nineteenth-
century authors?  The aversion of empirical disciplines to such non-empirical concepts as 
personhood and agency, and their methodological exclusion of the very idea of value would 
make this a difficult task.  Recent neuroscientific (MRI) investigations into free will might 
provide a useful starting point for anyone interested in this sociological question, as might the 
research results of experimental or evolutionary psychologists studying what they take human 
beings to be.  In this paper, I turn instead to a more basic issue of science.  I will question the 
universality of a principle of identity assumed by a scientific understanding of what it means for 
anything to exist.  I will argue that the essential features of human existence present an 
exception to this principle of identity and thereby fall outside the grasp of scientific inquiry.  
The basis of this argument will be an explanation of why it is nonetheless rational for us to 
affirm personhood, agency, moral values, and many more concepts that disappear under the 
scrutiny of the sciences. 
1 – Options for a meaningless world   
We are members of a social species, but also individuals whose agency implies a 
capacity for self-reflective, rational choice.  This capacity is essential to our identity, and 
suggests why it is unjust to treat people merely as members of a species who can be herded 
into social arrangements without their consent.  Such basic features of our civic life as 
individual rights and the rule of law assume the interrelated concepts of agency and 
personhood.  Yet these concepts are fleeing our conceptual stage before the research results of 
neuroscientists, experimental psychologists, theorists of information technology, and 
philosophers who have eliminated concepts integral to the self – e.g., in addition to agency, 
belief, meaning, value, even consciousness.  Daniel Dennett has presented a softer option to 
those of us who are reluctant to eliminate these concepts outright.  He encourages us to view 
the self and its associated intentional-mental entities as things without real ontological status, 
as part of a pre-scientific inheritance which we maintain for practical purpose while the 
sciences gradually reveal the inventory of our actual ontology.  It seems that if we are to keep 
faith with the sciences, we must, immediately or through a gradual process of mediating 
diplomacy, accede to the dramatic conclusion that the concepts underlying our most basic view 
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of ourselves are illusory.  If we recognise that no replacement concepts within the sciences can 
begin to support anything like persons, free will, meaning, value, and so forth, we then face this 
paradox:  that our capacity for self-reflective, rational agency leads us to see its impossibility.  
This is not a transitional problem owing to the immaturity of our scientific theories, but a result 
of extending overly far the methods of exactitude expected by the sciences – more particularly 
of applying universally a methodological principle of identity based on the aim of precision to all 
categories of things that we believe might exist.  I will argue that the picture of reality left by a 
totalising application of this principle brings us as close to a vision of nihilism as we can 
coherently approach.  I will then offer an extra-scientific basis for conceiving and justifying our 
most basic concepts. 
Let us first pause to consider whether we should regard nihilism, or the allegedly 
destructive potential of the sciences, in such a dismal light.  We might consider an analogy with 
Nietzsche in his apparently ambiguous role as harbinger of nihilism and critic of a metaphysical 
inheritance which he regarded as life-denying and sought to sweep away.  Within the evolving 
phenomenon of the Enlightenment, scientific understanding often has been invoked to 
encourage us to clear away false or meaningless metaphysical encrustations of our civilisation 
which interfere with more natural forms of life or human flourishing.  Why not embrace 
nihilism in this sense, as a doctrine used to promote a clearer view of the lifeworld, or a more 
genuine way of existing as a species – as an existential application of experimental methods?  
We might then regard the destructive potential of the sciences as a salutary form of nihilism, 
performing a role similar to Nietzsche’s critique of European, post-Christian culture, which was 
aimed at hastening the demise of life-denying, otherworldly metaphysical values lingering 
falsely in late-modern secular society.   
Nietzsche’s critique can reasonably be seen as a reflection of Enlightenment values, 
though it would be misleading to say that his critique of metaphysics can be reconciled with a 
similarly directed positivist critique, or that he was an advocate of nihilism.  Nietzsche 
anticipated that a widespread loss of faith among educated Europeans in the metaphysical 
superstructure of their basic concepts and values eventually would leave European (and hence 
global) civilization adrift, vulnerable to an ongoing debasement of cultural and civic values, and 
subsequently prey to the most barbarous or insidious threats to civil society.  These concerns 
begin to explain the urgency of his call for a revaluation of all values, in his view the central task 
facing practical philosophy, and facing every human being who has an intellectual conscience.1  
While Nietzsche conceived this task in terms of recasting metaphysical concepts in naturalised 
terms, he strenuously promoted a critique of the mechanistic worldview implied by the 
methodology of the natural sciences, which had recently been given a special impetus by the 
publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859).2  He 
states this critique quite succinctly at one point in The Gay Science, when he says that “an 
essentially mechanistic world would be an essentially meaningless world.”3     
2 – Linguistic analysis and the meaningless of ethical norms 
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Fewer than fifty years after Nietzsche suggested that the quantitative procedures and 
formulas of science would reveal a meaningless world, philosophers of the Vienna Circle 
converged on several versions of the verification principle of meaning, an empiricist, logical-
semantic dictum that all (non-analytic) expressions that cannot be empirically verified or 
confirmed are meaningless, including ethical, aesthetic, and philosophical expressions.  Moritz 
Schlick, the founder of the Vienna Circle, offered an especially stark version of this principle of 
meaning; but in his treatise Problems of Ethics,4 he nevertheless struggled, unlike other 
members of the group, with the implications of the meaninglessness of ethics.  His treatise aims 
to produce a scientific account of ethical values which would establish ethics as a sub-discipline 
of psychology.  But it also aims to provide a practical basis for ethics.  Schlick contrasts this 
surprising secondary objective with philosophical attempts to justify ethical values, which, from 
the standpoint of his theory of meaning, would be nonsensical.   
In his preface, Schlick characterizes his treatise as an effort to “communicate some 
truths – in [his] opinion not unimportant ones” – which serve as a philosophical stimulus and 
which are intended to change the orientation of ethics.5  Despite his commitment to the 
verification theory of meaning, his re-orientation includes a relative (non-metaphysical) 
justification of ethics.  Schlick modestly allows that his project might be “an illusion,”6 and of 
course it is difficult to imagine how any program to save ethics would not at some point 
embrace illusion if all non-empirical expressions are meaningless.  Schlick’s proposal of a re-
orientation of ethics nonetheless represents a distinct and subtle alternative to 
consequentialist efforts to salvage ethics within a scientific understanding of reality, including 
utilitarianism, which Schlick regards as the most promising traditional ethical theory to consider 
if we are to find an empirical basis for ethics. 
Schlick’s re-orientation divides the discipline of ethics into two types of inquiry:  pseudo 
inquiries about whether particular ethical values or norms are true or false or can be justified, 
and a factual, scientific (psychological-sociological) inquiry into the moral values that people 
actually hold.  His critique of the first type of inquiry, unsurprisingly, dismisses ethical discourse 
per se as cognitively meaningless, i.e. as neither true nor false.  But he charitably allows an 
array of ethical concepts – value, approbation, desire, right, wrong, ought, evil, good, the good, 
even the life of the soul – to serve as conceptual place holders while he elucidates the 
perversity of traditional ethical theories which have tried to justify moral values or normative 
principles.  The following remark about J. S. Mill and his critics – directed more at his critics – 
suggests why he regards the attempt of philosophers to argue over the validity of ethics as 
perverse, and hints at Schlick’s method of analysis: 
Mill believed himself able to deduce what is in itself desirable from what is actually 
desired; his opponents held that these had nothing to do with one another.  But 
ultimately neither side knew what it said, for both failed to give an absolute meaning to 
the word “desirable.”  The question whether something is desirable for its own sake is 
no question at all, but mere empty words.7 
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Schlick tries to get around the problem of the emptiness of moral language by referring 
to values in a “relative-hypothetical way.”8  Values described in this way are relative to the 
pleasure that those who hold them experience.  Since the feeling of pleasure is a fact, an 
expression intended to describe this feeling might be meaningful; as Schlick says, “the sense of 
every proposition concerning the value of an object consists in the fact that this object, or the 
idea of it, produces a feeling of pleasure or pain in some subject.”9  In this relative sense, is it 
possible to attribute meaning to a value expression, such as ‘Mary should believe X’?  An 
empirically verifiable sense can be given to the expression if the word ‘should’ refers to the fact 
that belief in X (the object) causes “a feeling of pleasure” in Mary (the subject).  But does this 
sense imply the same meaning as the original sentence?  And does the statement that ‘Belief in 
X produces a feeling of pleasure in Mary’ entail that Mary should believe X?  It is not obvious 
how Schlick’s procedure can begin to overcome these kinds of problems.  Another problem 
involves the indeterminate relativity of values based in individual feelings. 
To avoid the open-ended relativity of what he refers to as “ego-centric ethics,” Schlick 
insists that ethics, though grounded in “the feeling of a subject,”10 must refer ultimately to a 
society’s values, to the norms that societies in various places and times have actually adopted.  
Utilitarian theory maintains a similar priority of social over individual values, as the principle of 
utility implies a maximization of net pleasure, as opposed to the particular pleasure of 
individuals.  While pleasure obviously can only be experienced by individuals, the qualification 
of net pleasure implies that ethics is grounded in the good of global society – indeed of all 
species whose members are capable of experiencing pleasure.  Schlick similarly avoids an ego-
centric ethics, by stipulating that ethical values are based on an average belief among the 
members of a particular society that their society’s ethical norms will increase their extended 
experience of pleasure.  In this way, his proposal narrows the relativity of ethical values to 
differences of norms between distinct societies. 
Schlick’s (stipulated) proposal aims to deal with two insuperable problems that face the 
empiricist aspirations of utilitarians.  Utilitarianism purportedly offers a non-metaphysical, 
empirically respectable ethical theory which positivists, if they could coherently support an 
ethical theory, would presumably find appealing.  By interpreting pleasure as the good, the 
theory interprets values as physically based states of affairs; and with this interpretation, 
ethical justifications appealing to these states may be reduced to a series of empirical 
calculations.  Yet, from an empirical point of view, the theory fails on both counts.  The principle 
of utility, which holds that the good is equivalent to pleasure, is clearly a metaphysical 
assertion; so, at its core, the theory is non-empirical.  Further, the apparently helpful 
qualification that the principle prescribes a calculation of net utility impairs its application; for it 
is difficult or impossible to verify or confirm ethical judgements based on events which have no 
definite boundaries to measure and which can continue to unfold indefinitely into the future.  
The principle’s prescription that such events should be measured therefore comes to grief on 
the verification principle, which holds that judgements without a finite justification are 
meaningless.   
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Schlick’s account of ethics purportedly evades a significant challenge prompted by the 
second of these weaknesses.  His theory’s focus on beliefs, which have a definite truth value, 
rather than states of pleasure, which are endlessly variable and hence impossible to specify, 
avoids the problem of allowing justifications based on indeterminate and unfinishable 
calculations, but only if the consensus of belief stays fixed.  The consensus of many societies 
around core ethical values tends to remain stable.  The problem of indeterminate, incomplete 
justifications remains, however, since belief consensus or average belief is based on the 
members of such societies maintaining a stable view of the extended feelings of pleasure that 
their ethical norms or rules purportedly cause to be felt among them, and presumably these 
beliefs or views are more variable than the ethical norms or rules themselves.   
Perhaps Schlick’s belief-consensus method would secure a higher level of justification 
stability in societies in which the rule of law has been in place for a long while.  But stability of 
justification in this sense is not an epistemic value, and an emphasis on it might be both 
ethically and cognitively counterproductive.  For instance, the stability of the average belief, or 
consensus, of members of a society that their moral rules produce extended pleasure would 
tend to be enhanced by an increase in the dogmatism of a majority of members who maintain 
the consensus and potentially endangered by members who depart from the average belief, 
e.g., by doubting that belief in the extended pleasure of moral values properly works as a 
justification.  While there might be useful reasons for a society to foster stable attitudes in 
favour of its moral system, dogmatism is an epistemic sin, and it is unclear that an attitude that 
favours belief stability per se, let alone as a deciding principle, has epistemic merit.  Yet, for a 
Schlick-inspired moral apologist, attitudes encouraging belief stability would become 
epistemically virtuous, and within the timeframe of justification perhaps indispensable.  
Consider the dilemma of attempting to defend the very idea of moral values in a society 
populated by mentally energetic, rational, perceptive, imaginative individuals striving to lead 
examined ethical lives, as opposed to individuals whose attachment to their ethical norms are 
unreflective, blinkered or dogmatic.  As the basis of stable belief in such a society changed, or, 
as seems more likely, if it never existed, a Schlikean ethicist studying such a society would be 
forced to concede that its members are committed to nonsense, as a justification of their moral 
expressions and behaviour based on their beliefs would remain incomplete.  By contrast, 
completeness of justification in the case of a society of whose members cling to belief in their 
norms for the sake of their expected pleasure, or whose moral beliefs are mindlessly inert, 
would be readily available using Schlick’s consensus standard.  This contrast suggests that the 
standard of belief-consensus epistemically points us in the wrong direction; it cannot in any 
case provide a meta-standard for analyzing or justifying moral systems or values. 
From the standpoint of his empiricism, Schlick’s belief-consensus standard faces 
another, more basic problem; the apparent content of moral beliefs represented by any 
consensus must be empty if it relies on intentional concepts such as belief, desire, or value, or 
the subjects who embody these concepts.  In Problems of Ethics, Schlick never addresses the 
problematic nature of intentional concepts in general.  But as we have seen, he is aware of the 
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problem of the non-empirical nature of value in the traditional sense, of trying “to deduce what 
is in itself desirable from what is actually desired.”11  From the standpoint of his theory of 
meaning, the expression “what is in itself desirable” represents “mere empty words.”12  Of 
course the verification principle implies that all value terms are meaningless, which would seem 
to foil any attempt to save ethics.  As we have seen, his proposed solution to this problem is 
remarkably simple.  Even if there is nothing in the universe that is a value or “desirable for its 
own sake,” an investigator may still meaningfully refer to “what actually is desired for its own 
sake.”13  But this solution only saves ethics as an object of sociological, psychological, biological, 
etc. inquiry, not as a source of values that could justify a choice or an action.  Investigations into 
human behaviour are thus limited to empirical descriptions of practices, institutes, rituals, 
(alleged) acts, and so forth, which are inherently worthless and whose underlying (intentional) 
concepts are meaningless.  
3 – Nietzsche’s naturalism  
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche argues that an alternative, anti-positivist approach to science is 
needed to address nihilism or “the problem of the value of existence.”  He presents this 
problem as a long-developing European event which an “astronomer of the soul” might have 
expected to see arise since “the decline of faith in the Christian god, [and] the triumph of 
scientific atheism.”14  From this historical viewpoint, he speculates that the underlying question 
of nihilism – which he construes as approximately the same as the question “Does existence 
have any meaning at all?” – will require centuries before it is even properly heard15 and so will 
only gradually become a problem for future thinkers.  Nevertheless, Nietzsche approached the 
problem his entire career, offering diagnoses, insights, hypotheses, and thought experiments 
intended to illuminate its many facets; and he seemed to settle on, or at least never to revoke, 
his theory of the will to power, which he viewed as both an existential thought experiment and 
an explicit hypothesis intended to explain the basic impulse or motivating principle of all life.  
The will to power thus represents an instance of Nietzsche’s anti-positivist method of thinking 
about the problem of nihilism, and his most resilient attempt at a solution. 
But as a solution to the problem Nietzsche’s theory faces the same kind of objection 
that has often been directed against the (ancient and modern) theory that pleasure is the 
source of all value, which Nietzsche considered adopting before offering his theory.  We have 
seen this objection already:  the fact of a desire for pleasure (or power) does not imply its value.  
We can allow that a specifically directed desire is intentional – it is about something, has a 
content – and so in this sense is at least meaningful.  A world with creatures who produce or 
harbour desires thus might not be an entirely meaningless world.  But this implication does not 
solve the problem of the value of existence; for the world and everything that creatures in the 
world happen to value could be, though meaningful, utterly worthless, regardless of whether 
attraction to pleasure is a natural fact general over sentient creatures or the will to power is a 
universal natural fact about all life forms.   
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For Nietzsche’s thesis of the will to power plausibly to address the problem of value, it 
would require an independent standard, on the basis of which assertions that particular 
expressions of power are valuable might be justified; otherwise, an expression of power might 
be meaningful in the limited sense described above but nevertheless worthless, and claims that 
the impulse to grow or expand is a value, or that a conscious or unconscious will to life is 
valuable,16 would be baseless.  Yet the need for an independent value standard or conception 
of the good would seem to amount to a need for metaphysics which, despite his derision of 
positivism, Nietzsche evidently disavows: 
Metaphysics is still needed by some; but so is the impetuous demand for certainty that 
today discharges itself among large numbers of people in a scientific-positivistic form.17 
Nietzsche does not appear to be referring here exclusively, or primarily, to a “demand 
for certainty” among scientists using methods appropriate to their (mechanistic) inquiries but 
to a general desire “that something should be firm”18 in the universe.  Even though he regarded 
the mechanistic worldview of positivist science as itself nihilistic, and responsible for hastening 
the advent of a general recognition of “the problem of the value of existence,” he thought that 
it satisfied a need for a kind of (non-metaphysical) existential-epistemic support among people 
who are vaguely anticipating but not yet fully aware of the nature of the problem. 
 Nietzsche regarded the “demand for certainty” as impetuous because he recognised 
that certainty is unavailable in a post-metaphysical, Darwinian world.  His anti-positivist 
naturalism, or gay science, involves abandoning metaphysics, certainty, and any basis for 
existential security.  Arguably Nietzsche had acquired an overly wrought, overly generalised 
view of metaphysics.  But his attitude toward his metaphysically oriented predecessors was 
complicated.  In section 357 of The Gay Science, Nietzsche brings several metaphysical insights 
of the leading figures of the German philosophical tradition – Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and 
Schopenhauer – into opposition with the metaphysical “need of ‘the German soul,’”19 and 
offers corresponding examples of how these metaphysical contributions helped prepare the 
way conceptually for some of the most significant developments of modern science, including 
the acceptance of “Darwinism.”20  But in the final analysis Nietzsche felt that metaphysics was 
dead and that a metaphysical conception of human identity therefore was no longer available. 
 Rejection of a metaphysical conception of ontology, including human ontology, is now 
widespread, though perhaps, as Nietzsche’s says, it will take a very long time before the 
accompanying question of nihilism “can . . . be heard completely and in its full depth.”21  Of 
course we have no idea how a hypothetical event involving such recognition might occur, 
gradually along with all manner of other conceptual and practical changes of a globalized, 
hyper-technological world, or whether it will occur at all.  Recognition of the problem of 
nihilism might have reached its zenith with thinkers of the early 20th-century (Weber, Husserl, 
Heidegger, Camus, etc.), and in the prolific literary and artistic output of modernism, much of 
which drew inspiration from Nietzsche.  Perhaps the practical trends of the world will displace 
the question of nihilism, or erode without widespread recognition the concepts and values that 
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the thesis of nihilism entails are illusory.  Would it matter if this last possibility came to pass, or 
if we turned our back on the problem for some other reason?   
4 – Dennett’s diplomacy 
According to Daniel Dennett, whatever anxiety we might feel concerning our basic 
values, their practical or cognitive fate literally cannot matter if the thesis of nihilism is correct.  
Dennett takes this position in Elbow Room, where he says that it cannot matter if we carry on 
and lead our lives as though the thesis were false.22  One might sympathise with this attitude if 
we have entered a cul-de-sac in which all reasonable hope of discerning a foundation for our 
values has disappeared.  Yet as widespread as this anti-foundational belief has become, it is 
based on a few fragile methodological assumptions which seem to trace their origin to the 
view, shared by Nietzsche and positivists, that naturalism precludes metaphysics, or the slightly 
more nuanced view that a metaphysical naturalism needs to be constrained by a scientific 
understanding of reality. 
We have approached the positivist side of this view from the standpoint a logical 
empiricism which foreclosed on the possibility of metaphysical inquiry by ruling out in principle 
metaphysical or philosophical assertions.  Despite the well-known failure of the principle of 
verification to offer a coherent account of meaning, a less explicit commitment to the view that 
only empirical statements really need to be accommodated is alive and flourishing, not only 
among those scientists, experimental psychologists, information theorists, etc. who are 
ignorant of the history of ideas, but among many philosophers who understand the failure of 
logical positivism but have kept alive the attitude of positivism, presumably without a definitive 
view of the logical-semantic status of metaphysical statements, nor a pristine policy concerning 
which non-empirical concepts should be permitted within the vicinity of legitimate inquiry.  
Complicating this attitude for Dennett and many philosophers is their rejection of the subject-
object distinction.   
An assumption of the subject-object distinction which few philosophers find entirely 
congenial is that of a radically independent or theory-free reality, a thing-in-itself.  Once we 
give up this idea, it seems to follow that we need to change our view that science provides the 
best method for revealing the underlying features of reality, to a more modest proposition 
about the best method for revealing our extended presence to ourselves.  Nothing changes on 
the practical level of inquiry.  A scientific approach to knowledge acquisition – or data 
accumulation and elaboration – remains more consistently fruitful and trustworthy than any 
other means of understanding the world; but if we relinquish the subject-object distinction, 
instead of yielding the world-in-itself, science leaves us with the scientific image of reality, 
which nonetheless still might extend, radically alter, and generally contrasts favourably with, 
our manifest or common sense image.   
This post-dualist outlook suggests one way that we might reconcile the apparent tension 
between metaphysics and naturalism.  We can no longer assume that observation sentences 
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carry a special epistemic status, or that they simply provide information about the world.  Our 
recourse to observation sentences depends on an indeterminately large, critical mass of 
sentences, concepts, formulas, whatever cognitive resources we cannot do without as we form 
our image of the world.  Within this indeterminate scheme, no sentence confirms pieces of our 
understanding of the world in isolation; every observation sentence is entangled with 
statements or beliefs far flung from observation.  And many of these far-flung sentences may 
count as metaphysical in some sense. 
 Dennett’s epistemic division of our view of reality follows in this tradition, which we 
might trace to W. V. Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.”23  Dennett is prepared to 
countenance objects such as beliefs, desires, persons, free will, and so on, and so seems to 
venture well beyond the metaphysical commitments which Quine was prepared to endorse.24  
But his accommodation of these objects is fastidious to a fault, to the point where it is not clear 
that cognitively he really accommodates them at all, i.e. really regards them as part of reality.  
When he adopts the intentional stance,25 e.g., he postulates these problematic intentional 
entities but only as theoretical fictions:  he presents them as semi-real surrogates of underlying 
physical conditions that produce behaviour that we can count on for its predictive value.  From 
the intentional stance, when we refer to instances of behaviour such as a belief, acts, etc., we 
are merely invoking a conceptual prop, which does not imply the concepts that conventionally 
we attribute to the behaviour.  We should admire Dennett for his aversion to ontological 
profligacy and for gamely trying to maintain highly useful commitments of our common sense 
image of human reality which cannot entirely be reconciled with a scientific understanding of 
reality.  But notwithstanding its apparent pragmatic value, this kind of accommodation is 
systematically deceptive, and cognitively perilous.  Once the veneer of fictionalised theoretical 
postulates has been stripped away, we are left with an image of the world bereft of the 
intentional constituents that permit us to formulate the thoughts that we are presently 
considering, or any thoughts, including those ultimately presupposed by any view of reality.  
The absurdity of these implications suggests that Dennett’s division of reality is unsalvageable.  
Quine’s ontology leaves us with a similarly absurd outcome, but he is more directly candid than 
Dennett about the kinds of things a scientific understanding of the world permits, and hence 
leaves us a clearer view of the fundamental inadequacy of his eliminative epistemic program. 
5 – Quine’s principle of identity and the scientific image of reality 
 Quine’s elimination of concepts basic to our manifest view of reality is based on an 
ontological constraint which in some version or other many philosophers and scientists regard 
as obvious, namely that in order justifiably to postulate an object’s existence we must be able 
to specify its criteria of identity.  This constraint is expressed by Quine’s famous dictum “No 
entity without identity.”26  The prolific and singularly reliable results of the natural sciences, 
whose postulated entities are expected to be confirmed by staggeringly high degrees of 
precision, provides a pragmatic justification for such a dictum, and a compelling motive for 
insisting that its application extends over all categories of existence.  Quine seems to have been 
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motivated by these pragmatic reasons, but perhaps also by an apprehension over his holism, 
his rejection of the subject-object distinction, which implies the impossibility of describing the 
world purely, without implicating the language and concepts of the subjects who ask about and 
harbour beliefs about its reality. 
 Dennett evinces a similar apprehension when he describes intentional objects – e.g. 
beliefs, desires, values, and persons – as sort of real but not real in the sense that the entities of 
particle physics are real, or as real as the assemblages of neurons which underlie intentional 
objects, which are more real than these subject-based objects by the standard of Quine’s 
identity-criteria dictum because their identity can be specified, confirmed, and predicted with 
greater precision.  We might wonder why Dennett does not simply take Quine’s candid 
approach and banish intentional objects from his ontology.  His more diplomatic stance instead 
establishes careful protocols for preserving talk of intentional objects.  In turn, these protocols 
permit us to talk derivatively of moral values, institutes and practices which we take to be 
essential for civil society, or to refer to dispositions such as agency which we ordinarily regard 
as essential to our understanding of human identity.  As citizens or members of just, even 
barely tolerable, societies we should perhaps appreciate Dennett’s diplomatic stance; its 
protocols entail an easing of the principle of identity which permits us to maintain our 
otherwise (apparently) empty talk of persons, freedom, and morality, the cornerstone concepts 
of a just society.  But in reality Dennett’s scheme has massively switched the topic concerning 
these elusive objects; his apparent motive for relaxing Quine’s identity dictum misses their 
nature, which in principle is not transparent and which can never wholly be subsumed by 
procedures of quasi-empirical identification, by confirmation and predictability procedures 
analogous with those constraining productive inquiry in the sciences. 
A problem with Dennett’s easing of this principle of identity beyond scientific inquiry is 
that he has actually already wished away – sort of wished away? – the subjects implicated by 
the intentional stance which he thinks supports subject-related inquiries into the world.  For 
the most basic (physical) stance from which we view the world eliminates things like subjects.  
Dennett’s hierarchy of stances aside,27 what would it mean for such a wish to come to pass?  
The essential motive for rejecting the subject-object distinction was recognition of the 
inextricability of the subject and its associated concepts and conceptual practices from the 
world of objects?  From the start – which for narrative convenience we traced to Quine “Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) – this motive was crossed with competing interests, which have 
yielded a half-hearted result, revealing a more thoroughly meaningless world than the positivist 
worldview it replaced.  For now the world of objects no longer has a basis in reality, but instead 
amounts to an image of reality, and the subjects who are meant to manage this image can 
never hope to satisfy the identity conditions of their own existence.  Instead of reality, we are 
left with a ghostly theoretical representation, managed by non-existent entities, a physicalism 
indistinguishable from idealism and yet mysteriously bereft of subjects. 
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Understanding and applying the ontological principle which underwrites the scientific 
image of reality presupposes what the demands of its methods almost certainly preclude – viz., 
all the intentional concepts that will never find safe haven in a thoroughly scientific 
understanding of reality.  Without these concepts, thought itself becomes impossible, which 
leaves entities like us stuck in the conundrum that motivated rejection of the subject-object 
distinction in the first place – of postulating a pure world, cut off from thought.  As I suggest 
above, a view of reality presupposes thought, and thought presupposes various scarcely 
specifiable intentional and related concepts.  Even a scientific view of reality?  What kind of 
new science might we be imagining?  The problems and revisions of science are generated 
primarily by discoveries within science.  In saying that the intentional concepts of thought are 
presupposed by a scientific view of reality we are not claiming that these concepts play an 
inside role in the operations that expand our empirical knowledge of the world.  Accordingly, 
we are not proposing a particular view or modification of science.  Intentional concepts and 
concepts integral to these – e.g., meaning and truth – form an essential background, or meta-
context, of thought and inquiry which we subjects sometimes artificially bracket, e.g. when we 
try to discern precisely quantifiable features of the world.  Science operates with far greater 
efficiency and clarity when methodologically it excludes our role – which is to acknowledge that 
Quine’s principle of identity, insofar as it brackets intentional concepts, has a far-reaching 
pragmatic significance and importance. 
6 – Restoring the (intentional cum physical) world from its image 
Kant’s critical philosophy arrives at the conclusion that concepts basic to thought are 
non-empirical and yet forced on us as presuppositions without which empirical inquiry or 
experience, or our knowledge of the objects of experience, would be impossible.  Yet it would 
be misleading to acknowledge Kant’s presuppositional deduction as the origin of the 
presuppositional argument that I sketched above; for our discussion incurs none of the 
complications involving the inaccessible reality (noumena) assumed by Kant’s analogous 
(transcendental) argument.  The more modest version of the argument that we considered is 
based on a remark of Donald Davidson’s that defends the reality of intentional concepts – 
beliefs, desires, values, etc. – and concepts inseparable from the intentional – truth and 
meaning:  “All these concepts (and more) are essential to thought, and cannot be reduced to 
anything simpler and more fundamental.”28   
This assertion signals a radical departure from Quine’s ontology, perhaps even more 
radical than Davidson imagined.  Davidson has at least tacitly given up on Quine’s principle of 
identity while leaving his commitment to a naturalist ontology untouched.  Davidson’s claim 
that we must retain intentional concepts can, in any case, be supported by a few related 
observations that provide further motivation for rejecting Quine’s principle.  First, the concepts 
presupposed by thought that are not reducible “to anything simpler and more fundamental” 
are irreducibly complex.29  These concepts are irreducibly complex because they, like the selves 
they comprise, exist developmentally and indeterminately over time, and because they are 
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essentially interrelated and thus interdependent.  As we have seen, an incomplete list includes 
the concepts of belief, desire, value, meaning, truth, and consciousness.  The claim that these 
concepts are irreducibly complex because of what it means for them to be essentially temporal 
and interdependent is supported by this additional claim:  that none of these concepts, insofar 
as they are realised in thought, can be separated from an actual, physical thinker, which is a 
concrete consequence of abandoning the subject-object distinction; they are constituent 
features of an embodied self.   
Beliefs, for example, are not mere abstractions, reducible to their propositional content.  
Without physical persons or creatures capable of holding beliefs, there would be no beliefs.  
Beliefs also represent a disposition, an embodied desire (What else could a desire be but 
embodied?).  Yet, while beliefs are not reducible to propositional content, to meaning, they 
obviously incorporate meaning, which is to say that beliefs are intentional, are about 
something.  As such, since meaning is a constituent of belief, it too, in one use of the word, is 
not a mere abstraction.  Nor is truth (no doubt a difficult thought for many philosophers to 
abide), which is a requirement of meaning, merely an abstraction.  All these elements have a 
real existence insofar as they are embodied; and since they are an indispensable part of us, 
embodied subjects who are not separable from the world of objects which gave us birth, they 
are as much a part of a general ontology as the elementary particles or wave functions (or ?) of 
the physical universe, only they are not the kind of entities that can be captured entirely by the 
quantitative criteria of identity required by a scientific understanding of what it means to be 
something.     
That our identity is embodied dispels the spectre of an image world, a worldview which 
inadvertently suggests the doctrine of idealism.  We would not be conscious of anything had we 
not first been formed by unconscious physical processes which continue to support our 
consciousness.  That non-conscious physical events long preceded the existence of conscious 
beings, and reflect physical laws which were applicable before they were formulated by such 
beings indicates the baselessness of idealism.  The processes that formed us are inherently 
perceivable, or conjecturable, to whatever extent we are in a position to postulate their reality 
and formulate the laws that accurately capture their behaviour; beyond this susceptibility to 
our perceptions and thought questions of ontology are baseless – unless we could meaningfully 
assert the paradoxical concept of an incomprehensible noumenal reality.   
If we have exorcised the tenacious subject-object distinction in all its forms, the 
sceptical claim that our best theories bind us to an image of reality that separates us from, or 
systematically distorts, reality becomes unintelligible; so too does the epistemic habit of 
referring to an image of reality, construed as something ghostly, a mere abstraction or virtual, 
“semi-real” thing.  However we care to characterize our outlook on things, the physical-logical 
reality of nature created us and the forms of reality incorporated into our actual, embodied 
views of the world; and through the perceptual, theoretical, and evaluative activities of the 
worldviews on the basis of which we act, think, inquire, etc., we create aspects of nature which 
13 
 
otherwise would remain a dead possibility.  We are thus thoroughly joined to nature as both a 
product and source of its creative physical cum intentional energies and surprising forms of 
existence 
7 – Expanding the problem of the value of existence 
It is hard to imagine that the problem of the value of existence ever occurred to a 
member of Homo sapiens prior to the development of transfiguring social structures and 
cultural traditions.  In addition to biological evolution, a cultural evolution of some kind was in 
any event needed to produce philosophical thought from the creative intentional energies we 
share with other sentient species whose members perceive, feel, or in some analogous sense 
think.  The capacity of the intentional sphere of existence was thus dramatically enhanced;30 
there were now self-reflective, theorizing agents in the world, whose intentional energies 
represented a novel source of creativity.  This human capacity for self-reflective, theoretical 
thought entails the power to create explicit meaning, which is a unique ontological capacity if 
meaning is not a mere abstraction but is realised in actual thought, and if this capacity begins 
radically altering the world and bringing into it new varieties of – e.g. technological, economic, 
legal, political, aesthetic – meaning-embedded phenomena.  But in what sense can we say that 
such phenomena are meaningful, and why characterize their meaning as an essential part of 
their existence? 
Aesthetic phenomena in particular raise a basic concern for an ontology of meaning.  
Many philosophers in the analytic tradition dismiss the idea of aesthetic (fictional, imaginal, 
mimetic) meaning out of hand; and no doubt many who countenance the idea believe that it 
counts against the proposal that meaning has an ontology, that there are meaning-dependent 
entities – e.g. smiles or musical movements31 – which, inseparably from their unfolding, 
indeterminate meaning, really exist.  Beyond the empiricist scruples of this tradition, we 
commonly perceive smiles and music as events embodying a significance that distortions of 
facial muscles and collections of sounds lack; we perceive their embodied meaning as actually 
existing, as objective events of our subjective experience, and not as ghostly phenomena, as we 
do when recovering them in memory or conjuring them in imagination.  But if these meanings, 
unlike abstract propositional meaning, are, though embodied, dependent on our perceptions 
and interpretations, their identity conditions can never in principle be settled; they are 
essentially indeterminate.  If this is our conclusion, can we then coherently accept the idea of 
aesthetic meaning?   
This question raises an obvious concern, but it also assumes an over-generalizing view of 
identity if it turns out that parts of our reality are by nature irreducibly mixed and variable in 
the way that we have been suggesting intentional entities are.  The view coincides with Quine’s 
dictum that only entities that can be definitely picked out are real, which requires us to state, or 
aim to achieve, a specific and finite set of identity criteria for every object of our ontology.  
Without this constraint, we seem to deprive ourselves of a semantic basis for making 
statements about the things of the world, for thinking about or communicating the truth or 
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content of these statements.  As important as this concern is, it over-dramatizes the ontological 
problem, by equivocating between the nature of objects and the status of the descriptions that 
we give of those objects.  The meaning of a description or statement must be fixed if it is to 
communicate precisely something or anything about an entity.  But there is always more to be 
said about even the most ordinary objects if we, or we and others, are curious and resourceful 
enough, and have time enough, e.g. over a tradition, to satisfy our curiosity.  Objects exist in 
time, and their contexts and inter-relationships with other objects vary without end, or until 
our traditions collapse.  Unless we treat objects as abstractions, we can never specify and 
exhaust the meaning of things, however simple and stable we imagine they are, nor reduce 
their role in our ontology to simpler things as we attempt to lay bare the shared or universal 
features of the world.  The case of aesthetic objects amplifies this problem insofar as there are 
far fewer constraints on the meanings that potentially could expand their identity.  But then 
once we permit the meaning of things to count as part of their identity, the problem is general 
over all objects, so that we might come to see the world in any particular object, however 
insignificant it may seem to us at first glance or from the methodological standpoint that we 
adopt when narrowing the objectives of our inquiry.  Of course a dramatic implication of this 
suggestion is that objects are ultimately unbounded by any specific description that we can 
provide, or perception we share.   
Another concern about meaning-dependent aesthetic objects is that their meaning 
directs us away from the real world towards a fictional, created world.  This concern comes 
from the view of many analytic philosophers that meaning is reducible to propositional truth, 
which looks like a promising position if we accept, as we should, that only propositions 
(statements) explicitly represent truths about reality.  We should accept this constraint on 
meaning and truth and yet challenge its reach by distinguishing between indeterminate 
expressions which suggest truths and statements which fix truth and meaning.  With this 
contrast in place, we can make more sense than we would otherwise of Aristotle’s famous 
claim in The Poetics that “Poetry is more philosophical and nobler than history.”32  Poetry, 
though it deals in fiction, is capable of expressing (not stating) philosophical and universal 
truths more readily than history (conceived as a series of chronological descriptions), since it 
deals in hypothetical events which concentrate and expand our understanding of human 
nature.  Aristotle’s contrast may be used to qualify the analytic principle that meaning depends 
on specifiable truth conditions, or explicit statements whose meaning can in principle be fully 
elucidated.  For while only the meaning of statements can be elucidated, aesthetic expression is 
sometimes far more, if not uniquely, adept at bringing its viewer, reader or listener into 
intimate communion with elusive aspects of human reality than a single statement or 
voluminous series of statements, however precise and discerning their author may be.  What 
kind of aspects?  Intentional aspects – e.g., a stream of interrelated beliefs, perceptions, 
anxieties, terror, pity, aspirations, and so forth, experienced through the interplay of music and 
drama in a tragedy – which illuminate the bridge between our inner world and actions of an 
external world that we share with others.  An objection that mimetically induced intentional 
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entities (streams of entities) which connect our inner world to the external world of others are 
fictional and therefore unreal ignores the frequently seamless relation of these beliefs and 
perceptions elicited by aesthetic objects to the beliefs and perceptions that form our objective, 
shared experience of reality; and it misses the sense of Aristotle’s insight that aesthetic 
expressions tend to induce a richer, more penetrating understanding of our shared human 
reality than do factual descriptions.   
8 – Dissolving the problem of nihilism 
In the posthumous notes of The Will to Power, Nietzsche proposed an experimental 
model of philosophy which centered on a “quest for even the most detested and notorious 
sides of existence.”33  This model, according to Nietzsche, underwrites “the hidden history of 
philosophy” whose exemplars may be discovered by asking “How much truth can a spirit 
endure, how much truth does a spirit dare?”  Evidently, a thinker’s capacity to affirm reality in 
the face nihilism provides the most demanding standard for deciding these related questions: 
Such an experimental philosophy as I live anticipates experimentally even the 
possibilities of the most fundamental nihilism; but this does not mean that it must halt 
at a negation, a No, a will to negation.  It wants rather to cross over to the opposite of 
this – to a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or 
selection . . . my formula for this is amor fati.34 
 Nietzsche’s “Dionysian” formula for overcoming the problem of nihilism may seem to 
represent a promising attitude if, believing the world to be valueless, one wishes to cope 
psychologically.  His insistence that this “affirmation of the world” should eschew every 
falsification of reality is certainly commendable.  But the formula is utterly empty if the world is 
valueless, or if there are no cognitive grounds for asserting values.  A meaningful application of 
amor fati depends on a world replete with values which are fragile and uncertain, not non-
existent.  If, for example, we (mistakenly) assume that the world is valueless and contains only 
empirical facts, we cannot coherently entertain a prescription to affirm “the world as it is.”  
Such an affirmation would amount tacitly to endorsing a deception that implies a falsification of 
reality after all, indeed, if fully explicated, a self-contradictory statement. 
 This empiricist assumption, which Nietzsche found alluring despite his long-sustained 
criticism of empiricism, is mistaken.  Values occupy roughly the same global position in our 
cognitive life as facts.  In the face of a sceptical challenge to our belief in empirical reality, one 
would be in error strenuously or mildly to assert the existence of empirical truths as a category 
which must be affirmed.  From a holistic view of things, the sceptical challenge against which 
one might be tempted to make such a peculiar assertion is the source of this error.  Empirical 
truths cannot be disentangled from the language, theories, thoughts, beliefs, concepts, 
perceptions, values, etc. that would let us make sense of this singular objection.  The sceptic 
would thus need to widen the scope of her challenge, to the point of depriving herself of a basis 
for making or even conceiving it.  Likewise, as the foregoing list of intentional commitments 
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suggests, a sceptical challenge intended to undermine the category of evaluative truths draws 
us into a similarly mistaken view of our cognitive life and its inherent obligations.  We could no 
more doubt the existence of values in the world than we could doubt the world, or eliminate 
the thought that brings the world continuously into view and encourages us frequently to 
revise the view of reality it leaves us with.  That we should often revise our view is a value which 
is often immediately compelling, and sometimes the result of agency and reflection.  Value or 
the good (conceived as widely dispersed) is thus a cognitive obligation which arrives naturally 
and as a presupposition of our extended methods of thought; it is an obligation in which the 
value of truth and the cognitive indispensability of value can scarcely be distinguished.  The 
embodied concepts or intentional entities which inhabit us and bring the world into our soul 
and our soul into the world, though they dissolve with astonishing rapidity in their ever passing 
existence, lie beneath sceptical challenge; they cannot coherently be reduced to the stuff of a 
mere dream, or virtual reality, whether constituted by our scientific or our prescientific 
imagination.  As Quine once said, in a wondrously lucid concession, “[the] idioms of 
propositional attitude – belief, hope, regret, and the rest – are not to be lightly dismissed.  It is 
not clear how we could do without them.”35  It is not clear; for without the intentional entities 
underlying these idioms we would be incapable of thought.  Only by paying such an 
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